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Abstract
We study mathematical models of the collaborative solving of a two-choice discrimination
task. We estimate the difference between the shared performance for a group of n observers
over a single person performance. Our paper is a theoretical extension of the recent work of
Bahrami et al. (2010) from a dyad (a pair) to a group of n interacting minds. We analyze
several models of communication, decision-making and hierarchical information-aggregation.
The maximal slope of psychometric function (closely related to the percentage of right
answers vs. easiness of the task) is a convenient parameter characterizing performance.
For every model we investigated, the group performance turns out to be a product of two
numbers: a scaling factor depending of the group size and an average performance. The
scaling factor is a power function of the group size (with the exponent ranging from 0 to
1), whereas the average is arithmetic mean, quadratic mean, or maximum of the individual
slopes. Moreover, voting can be almost as efficient as more elaborate communication models,
given the participants have similar individual performances.
Keywords: group decision making, two-alternative forced choice, decision aggregation,
group information processing, discriminative judgments, accuracy, discrimination
difficulty, bias, information sharing, group size, two-choice decision, distributive cognitive
systems, communication models, cognitive process modeling
1. Introduction
Anyone who has ever taken part in group decision making or problem solving has most
likely asked themselves at one point or another whether the process actually made any sense.
Would it not be better if the most competent person in the group simply made the decision?
In other words, it is an open question whether a group can ever outperform its most capable
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member. There have been many studies that have reported group decisions to be less
accurate (Corfman and Kahn, 1995). Some studies, however, have concluded that groups
— even when they merely use simple majority voting — can make better decisions than
their individual members (Grofman, 1978; Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Hastie and Kameda,
2005). We ask a more general question: how does the group performance depend upon
the individual performances of its participants and the ways in which those participants
communicate?
This question is given new light by recent trends in cognitive psychology, which after a
half a century of fascination with isolated cognition in the individual, has finally admitted the
individual interaction with the social environment. It is increasingly understood that joint
actions and joint cognition are not limited to situations of committee/voter decisions, but
instead, they pervade everyday life and require the constant coordination and integration
of cognitive and physical abilities. This new approach, typically called distributed cogni-
tion (Hutchins and Lintern, 1995), or extended cognition within the social domain (Clark,
2006), brings the focus of research to the mechanisms of cognitive and physical coordina-
tion (Kirsh, 2006) that affect this integration. It also brings attention to the comparison
of the performance of the group to the performance of the individual. For some tasks that
require different types of knowledge and abilities from group participants, groups are likely
to outperform individuals (Hill, 1982). For other tasks, such as simple discrimination tasks
or estimations, a question arises if a group is indeed better than the best of its members. If
there are such situations, it is important to know when they arise.
Group decision making obviously involves members interacting with each other. Casting
a vote requires a minimum amount of communication for the individual (only to inform
other group members about his or her choice). However, other group decisions allow for
extensive communication and negotiations of the decision. Our questions are: 1) which
forms of communication are most likely to facilitate an improved outcome, and 2) what is
actually being communicated in successful groups? Recent experiments by Bahrami, Olsen,
Latham, Roepstorff, Rees, and Frith (2010) have shown that cooperation can be beneficial,
even in simple task, and that this benefit is best explained by the participants communicating
their relative confidences. In their study, dyads (pairs) performed a perceptual two-choice
discrimination task. On every trial participants had to decide which of two consecutive
stimuli (sets of Gabor patches) contained a patch with higher contrast. First, decisions
were collected from both persons; then, if the decisions were different, the participants were
allowed to communicate to reach a joint decision.
The decision data obtained from each person was used to fit a psychometric function,
i.e., the probability of that person giving a specific answer, as a function of the difference
of the contrast between Gabor patches. These functions describe the person’s skill in the
task. Similarly, a function describing the skill of the group as a whole can be estimated
from the group decisions. As was described by Bahrami: "In experiments (...) psychometric
functions were constructed for each observer and for the dyad by plotting the proportion of
trials in which the oddball was seen in the second interval against the contrast difference at
the oddball location" (Bahrami et al. (2010), Supplementary Materials, p. 3).
Various assumptions about the nature of within-group interactions during the joint
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decision-making process can be made. From these assumptions, we can derive theoreti-
cal relationships between the parameters of members’ functions and the parameters of the
group function. These are the models of decision making. The correctness of each joint
decision model can then be tested against empirical data.
Bahrami et al. (2010) described and evaluated four such models. One was own, in
which group members communicate their confidence in their individual choices. Another
model stemmed from signal detection theory (Sorkin et al., 2001). If members know each
other’s relative discriminatory ability (i.e., their psychometric functions), the group can
make a statistically optimal choice. Thus, under certain conditions, we have an upper
bound on group performance. The third model suggested that the dyad is only as good
as its best member. Finally, the last model tested was a control model involving random
response selection. The study concluded that, when similarly skilled persons meet, they can
both benefit from cooperation. A model in which participants communicate their relative
confidences best explains this benefit.
We extend the models from Bahrami et al. (2010) to groups of n participants and compare
their predictions. Furthermore, we add a model in which a participant either knows the
correct answer, or guesses. Importantly, in the case of larger groups, it may be the case that
only small subgroups of participants can communicate simultaneously. Thus, we address
this issue by considering hierarchical schemes of decision aggregation, in which decisions
are first made by subgroups, and then some of these subgroups interact to reach a shared
decision.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Bahrami et al. (2010)
approach to integrating individual discrimination functions in pairs of participants. We use
it to assess performance in groups. In Section 3, we proceed to formulating a series of models
of communication, which express the performance of a group of n persons as a function of
their individual performances. In Section 4, we investigate how each model works, assuming
several schemes of decision aggregation. Section 5 compares the introduced models and
provides insight into further experimental and theoretical work. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Model of discrimination
Consider an experiment in which a participant has to make simple discriminatory deci-
sions of varying difficulty. Each trial is assigned a parameter, c, that describes the physical
distance between stimuli (e.g., in the Bahrami et al. experiment c was the difference in
contrast between Gabor patches). Negative c describes a situation in which the right choice
is the first of the pair, whereas positive c describes the opposite situation. The absolute
value of c reflects the difficulty of a given trial. The lower the value, the more difficult is
the resulting trial. From now on, we refer to the parameter describing physical difference as
stimulus c. In the case of Bahrami et al. experimental setup, it can be interpreted as the
two-interval stimulus with the difference of contrasts equal to c.
By knowing the choices of a certain decision-making agent (in our case either a single
participant or a group making the decision together) for a range of stimuli, we can construct
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a mathematical description of the agent’s performance on the task.
For each agent, we can then determine his or her psychometric function: the probability
of the agent choosing the second answer as a function of the stimulus, P (c). An ideal
responder would be described by the Heaviside step function: P (c) = 0 for all negative
stimuli, and P (c) = 1 for all positive stimuli (i.e., choosing the second interval if and only if
c > 0).
Because responders make errors, the actual decision rule and probability are different.
One way to describe such a response is derived from signal detection theory (Sorkin et al.,
2001). According to it, for a stimulus c, a participant perceives stimulus x, which is a
normally distributed random variable centered around c+b and with variance σ, and decides
basing on the sign of x. Two models described in this paper (Weighted Confidence Sharing
and Direct Signal Sharing) use this mechanism explicitly. The modified realistic decision
rule of an agent states that if the observed stimuli x is negative, an agent decides to select
the first patch (therefore interpreting the difference in contrast as negative), in the case of
positive value, the second option is selected.
In particular, psychometric curves which are cumulative of the normal distribution:
P (c) = H
(
c+b
σ
)
, where (1)
H(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
(−t2/2) dt, (2)
result in a good fit for the experimental data (Bahrami et al., 2010). The parameter σ can
be interpreted as the participant’s uncertainty about the decision. The parameter b is the
bias (offset); it represents a tendency to choose a particular answer, see Fig. 1. The P (c)
function, defined as above, can be viewed as a convolution of the step function (the correct
answer) and the Gaussian distribution (the discriminative error).
-3 -2 -1 1 2 3 c - stimulus
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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PHcL - probability of choosing the second option
slope
bias
W
Figure 1: Plot of the psychometric function, with shown slope s and positive bias b.
For our purposes, we assume that bias is much smaller than the characteristic width
parameter, i.e., |b|  σ.
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Consequently, σ becomes the main determinant of the effectiveness of discrimination. It
is convenient to choose the maximal slope of the psychometric function
s =
1√
2piσ
, (3)
as the primary measure of the responding agent’s effectiveness.
Now, we can proceed to extending the Bahrami et al. (2010) models. We would like to
know how the performance of a group of n people depends upon their individual cognitive
performances. Therefore, we need to solve the explicit formulas for the propagation of
slopes and biases when combining several responders within each of the different models of
communication:
smodel = smodel(s1, b1, . . . , sn, bn), (4)
bmodel = bmodel(s1, b1, . . . , sn, bn). (5)
Each model is described by the shared decision function
Pmodel = f [P1, . . . , Pn] , (6)
where f is a functional. For all but two models that we investigate, Pmodel(c) = f [P1(c), . . . , Pn(c)],
that is, the dependence is pointwise (i.e., result for a given c requires only knowing individual
Pi(c) for the same c).
We can obtain the effective slope (4) and bias (5) using straightforward formulas that
involve taking the derivative of the psychometric function with respect to the stimulus:
smodel = P
′
model(c)|c=−bmodel ≈ P ′model(c)|c=0 (7)
bmodel =
[
b for which Pmodel(−b) = 1
2
]
≈ Pmodel(0)−
1
2
P ′model(c)|c=0
, (8)
where assuming (1) the approximation for the relative error for both s and b is of order
O(s2b2) (or equivalently, O( b2
σ2
)), where O(·) stands for big O notation. The derivation is in
Appendix A. Note that if Pmodel(c) is a cumulative Gaussian function (as in (1)), then the
formulas for slope (3) and (7) are equivalent. However, it can be used as a definition of the
slope and the bias in the general case of an arbitrary communication strategy Pmodel(c), even
if (1) does not hold. Bear in mind that for practical applications, we expect Pmodel(c) to be
close enough to the cumulative Gaussian function. Moreover, when there are no biases, for
all decision-making considered in this paper, the maximal slope is at c = 0.
A question arises about the relation between the psychometric curve parameters and the
expected rate of errors. To assess the average amount of incorrect answers we could expect
from a responder, we introduced the following quantity,
W (σ, b) =
∫ 0
−∞
P (c)dc+
∫ ∞
0
[1− P (c)] dc (9)
=
√
2
pi
σ exp
(
− b2
2σ2
)
+ b
[
2H
(
b
σ
)− 1] , (10)
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where we integrated the error function (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1965). For a uniform
distribution and range of stimuli, (−r, r) for r  (σ+ |b|), the rate of the incorrect responses
is given by W (σ, b)/(2r). The average number of wrong answers is always reduced when
lowering either width or bias, regardless of the other parameter’s value. This fact further
justifies the choice of the slope as the proper effectiveness measure. When there is no bias,
(10) simplifies to W (σ, 0) = 2/s; thus, the rate of the incorrect responses is 1/(rs).
3. Information-sharing models
In this section, we discuss different models of information sharing for n participants. It
is important to underline that the models incorporate the process of perceiving (what the
subjects may know), the state of mind (what the subjects know), and the communication
and the decision-making process (usually Bayes-optimal). We briefly define the assumptions
of each model and justify it in psychological terms. We give results in terms of the effective
psychometric function, Pmodel(c), the effective slope, smodel, and sometimes the effective bias,
bmodel (as for a few models the bias is poorly defined). Whenever calculations of Pmodel(c)
are not straightforward, we give some insight into the underlying mathematics.
We investigate the following models:
• 3.1 Random Responder,
• 3.2 Voting,
• 3.3 Best Decides,
• 3.4 Weighted Confidence Sharing,
• 3.5 Direct Signal Sharing,
• 3.6 Truth Wins.
3.1. Random Responder
Model. The trial decision of a random group member is taken as the group decision.
Motivation. Random Responder serves as one of the reference models, and it is not expected
to be fulfilled in most of realistic settings. Random factors determine the collective decision,
i.e., communication is seen as ineffective within framework of this model. Sometimes the
decision is not based on any evidence and people may have very misleading impressions of
their own accuracy. Additionally, their decisions may depend more upon a group member’s
charisma or persuasive skills than his or her psychometric skills. In the work of Bahrami
et al. (2010), this model is called ’Coin flip’.
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Results.
PRR(c) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Pi(c) (11)
After the differentiation, one obtains the slope (7) and the bias (8):
sRR ≈ s1 + . . .+ sn
n
(12)
bRR ≈ s1b1 + . . .+ snbn
s1 + . . .+ sn
(13)
The relative error both for sRR and bRR is O(s21b21) + . . .+O(s2nb2n). Note that PRR(c) is not
normal (1).
3.2. Voting
Model. Each participant makes her or his own decision. The majority vote determines the
decision of the group. In a case of equal votes for two outcomes, a coin is flipped.
Motivation. People may have no access to their accuracy (or they cannot communicate it
reliably); thus, a good strategy is to take voting as the final consensus result.
Results.
PV ot(c) =
bn−1
2
c∑
k=1
∑
~i
[1− Pi1(c)] · · · [1− Pik(c)]Pik+1(c) · · ·Pin(c) (14)
+
1
2
∑
~i
[1− Pi1(c)] · · ·
[
1− Pin/2(c)
]
Pin/2+1(c) · · ·Pin(c)

if n is even
,
where sum over~i denotes sum over every permutation of participants. We obtain (derivation
in Appendix B)
sV ot ≈ s1 + . . .+ sn
n
×
{
n
2n
(
n
n/2
)
if n is even
n
2n−1
(
(n−1)
(n−1)/2
)
if n is odd
(15)
≈
√
2
pi
×√n× s1 + . . .+ sn
n
(16)
bV ot ≈ s1b1 + . . .+ snbn
s1 + . . .+ sn
(17)
The PV ot(c) is not normal (1). The relative error both for sV ot and bV ot is O(s1b1) + . . . +
O(snbn). Note that the addition of an odd member to a group does not increase its average
performance. The formula (16) is an asymptotic expression for large n, which utilizes the
Wallis formula. For n = 2, the Random Responder and Voting models yield the same results.
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3.3. Best Decides
Model. The most accurate member of the group makes the decision. This model is called
Behavior and Feedback in Bahrami et al. (2010). In this model, we will focus on the case
with no bias, b = 0. Nonzero bias would make the result difficult to state in explicit form;
see (10) for further explanation.
Motivation. In some experimental settings, members of the group can determine, who is the
most accurate (e.g., when feedback is present). Group members can then let that individual
make the final decision. Studies by Henry (1995) suggest that, at least in some types of
tasks, participants can identify the most proficient member, so our assumption is plausible.
As in the previous models, there is no (effective) communication between the members of
the group.
Results.
PBD(c) = Pmember with the highest s(c) (18)
sBD = max(s1, . . . , sn) (19)
When biases are large, the group psychometric function is that of the most effective par-
ticipant (i.e., one with the lowest W (σi, bi) (10)), PBD(c) = Pi(c). This strategy is most
beneficial for a group with very diverse individual performances.
3.4. Weighted Confidence Sharing
Model. Group members share their relative confidences zi = xi/σi. The group decision
depends on the sign of
∑n
i=1 zi, i.e., for the negative they choose the first option and for the
positive they choose the second. This model requires each Pi(c) to be normal (1).
Motivation. The value xi is the stimulus perceived by i-th participant and has a distribution
with density P ′i (c), as it is in Sorkin et al. (2001). We assume the confidence to be a
continuous variable. The true stimulus c is, of course, common for all participants in a given
trial. The relative confidence is equivalent to a z-score, if the participant is unbiased (i.e.,
it is related to the probability that the participant is right). Put differently, participants
know their z-scores on a given trial but are unaware of their own parameters s and b. This
model was first introduced by Bahrami et al. (2010). It is possible that, in an experimental
trial, each participant can estimate and effectively communicate their relative confidences,
by using a coarse real-world approximation of one’s z-score, e.g., ’I lean towards 1st’, or ’I
am almost sure it is the 2nd’ ?. The study by Bahrami et al. (2010) suggests that this model
most accurately describes dyad performance.
Given relative confidences ~z = (z1, . . . , zn), the group has to determine whether to choose
the first or the second option. If there are only two participants with different opinions, the
one with the stronger confidence (for a given trial) decides. This can be written as follows:
the group chooses the first option if z1 + z2 ≤ 0, the second option otherwise, yielding an
optimal strategy (Bahrami et al., 2010). In the general case of n participants, we use the
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Bayes optimal reasoning. We calculate the probability that the stimulus is positive (and
thus the second answer is correct) given the z-scores provided by each participant:
p(c > 0|~z) =
∫ ∞
c=0
p(c|~z)dc =
∫∞
0
p(~z|c)p(c)dc∫∞
−∞ p(~z|c)p(c)dc
, (20)
where p(c) is the probability of a discrimination task with c. The probability of observing
zi-score, given stimulus c, is P ′i (c− σizi). Thus
p(~z|c) = P ′1(c− x1) · . . . · P ′n(c− xn). (21)
Let us assume that the displayed stimulus has a uniform distribution, i.e., that p(c) is
constant (not going into mathematical nuances). To define the decision function, we need to
know when p(c > 0|~z) ≥ 1/2 or, in other words, when the probability that the second answer
is correct is greater than 1/2. As (21) is a Gaussian function of c, finding its maximum leads
to the condition
x1
σ21
+ . . .+
xn
σ2n
≥ 0, (22)
or equivalently, using the slope parameter,
s1z1 + . . .+ snzn ≥ 0. (23)
Thus, when the condition holds, choosing the second option is the Bayes optimal choice.
Unfortunately, in this model we only have access to values of ~z, not to individual perfor-
mances. To obtain the precise answer, we need to know the whole distribution of σi (or si).
Instead, we can use the approximate condition for the choice of the second option,
z1 + . . .+ zn ≥ 0, (24)
to obtain a lower bound on the performance. The condition is exact for participants with
equal performances (and should be close to the optimal if the values of σi do not vary
much). This equation can be seen as a type of a weighted voting, where weights depend on
subjective confidences, but not on individual performances. Members do not know their own
— or their peers’ — performance scores, so there is no justification for assigning more or
less weight to a particular member throughout the experiment. The only thing that matters
is each member’s confidence in the present trial.
Results. To calculate PWCS(c), we need to compute, given stimulus c, the probability of
obtaining set ~z with a positive sum (24). Thus
PWCS(c) =
∫
x1/σ1+...+xn/σn≥0
exp
[
−(c+ b1 − x1)
2
2σ21
+ (25)
− . . .− (c+ bn − xn)
2
2σ2n
]
dx1 · · · dxn
(2pi)n/2σ1 · · ·σn
= H
[√
2pisWCS (c+ bWCS)
]
, (26)
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where the integration is based upon the fact that a sum of Gaussian random variables zi is
a Gaussian random variable (Piau, 2011). The resulting parameters are:
sWCS =
√
n× s1 + . . .+ sn
n
, (27)
bWCS =
s1b1 + . . .+ snbn
s1 + . . .+ sn
. (28)
Again, note that the above result for sWCS is the lower boundary value for optimal
Bayesian reasoning, exact only for n = 2 (due to symmetry) and a group of participants
with the same performance. By knowing the exact distribution of individual performances,
we can obtain a better (or at least the same) group performance. Then, instead of the
summation of individual z-scores (24), one will get a more complicated formula for the
decision.
3.5. Direct Signal Sharing
Model. Group members share both their perceived stimuli xi and their σi. The group de-
cision depends on the sign of
∑n
i=1 xi/σ
2
i . This model requires each Pi(c) to be normal
(1).
Motivation. As for the WCS, we assume that the value xi is the stimulus perceived by i-th
participant and has a distribution with the density P ′i (c), as it is in (Sorkin et al., 2001).
The group possesses complete knowledge about the characteristics of its members and their
perceptions, so its effectiveness is hindered only by the skill of the participants, not by
communication. This model constitutes the upper bound for group performance, provided
that the stimuli are fully defined by their stimulus values (and perceived according to the
discussed model). In the case of a more complex, non-perceptive task, it is possible for a
group to exceed this bound (Hill, 1982). For example, this could occur when participants’
skills complement each other. People know the strength of the stimuli but also their own
sensitivity. If the feedback is provided, we can plot x versus c to get σ.
Results. The final group decision follows the standard derivation of n classifiers collecting
independent results with normal distribution (e.g., Sorkin et al. (2001) and Bahrami et al.
(2010)):
PDSS(c) =
1
normalization
∫ c
−∞
P ′1(x) · . . . · P ′n(x)dx (29)
sDSS =
√
s21 + . . .+ s
2
n =
√
n×
√
s21 + . . .+ s
2
n
n
(30)
bDSS =
s21b1 + . . .+ s
2
nbn
s21 + . . .+ s
2
n
(31)
Note that, regardless of the distribution of the individual performances, the group perfor-
mance outscores both Best Decides and Weighted Confidence Sharing.
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3.6. Truth Wins
Model. We assume that on each trial each member is in one of the two states: either they
know the right answer or they are aware of their own ignorance. In the latter case, a random
guess is made. It is sufficient to have a single group member perceive the stimuli correctly
to get the correct group answer. We assume no bias, as there is no possible way to treat it
consistently and it introduces false convictions.
Motivation. For so-called Eureka problems, the signal-theoretic limit can be exceeded (Hill,
1982). The key is that the answer to such a problem has the property of demonstrability: it
allows a single member who has the correct answer to easily convince the rest of the group
of its correctness (Laughlin et al., 1975). People know if they see the ’right’ stimuli (and
all errors are due to guessing, not to false observations). This model has received much
attention in group decision theory, e.g., in Davis (1973). It is appropriate in situations when
the correctness of a solution can be demonstrated. However, we do not expect this model to
be applicable to tasks similar to that of Bahrami et al. (2010). This model serves as a control
and an explicit example of a result beyond one provided by the Direct Signal Sharing model.
We included it with the aim of generalizing the models to different decision situations.
Results. The probability that the responder knows with certainty the right answer is
R(c) = |2P (c)− 1| . (32)
That is, we have a reversed formula saying that, when a responder knows the answer with
probability R(c), the responder answers correctly with probability R(c) + (1 − R(c))/2 (as
there is the chance to answer correctly by a random guess). The probability that at least
one person knows the correct answer is
RTW (c) = 1− [1−R1(c)] · . . . · [1−Rn(c)] . (33)
Consequently,
PTW (c) =
sign(c)RTW (c) + 1
2
(34)
sTW = n× s1 + . . .+ sn
n
, (35)
where the slope is a result of straightforward differentiation (7).
This model yields much better results than other models; note, however, that the absence
of false observations is a strong requirement. Other models have to operate without this
assumption. Note that the PTW (c) is not normal.
4. Aggregation of information in hierarchical schemes
So far, we have assumed that information from all participants is simultaneously col-
lected and used in the group decision. One may argue that this is unrealistic for human
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communication in groups of more than a few persons. We, therefore, propose hierarchical
models (schemes) in which only small subgroups can communicate at a particular time. Each
of these subgroups reaches its own decision, in a manner described by one of the models
introduced in the previous section. Hence, the subgroup can be regarded as a decision-
making agent, described by a slope and a bias. The subgroup can then communicate with
other subgroups or individual members, which results in larger groups being created, until
all information is gathered and the final decision is made.
The results of employing a multi-level decision system can significantly deviate from what
simultaneous information collection predicts. For instance, in a two-level voting system,
which has been widely studied in the context of election results (Davis, 1973; Laughlin et al.,
1975) the final outcome depends heavily upon the distribution of votes in the subgroups,
sometimes allowing minority groups to overcome the majority, sometimes exaggerating the
power of the majority. It is thus interesting to study the possible effects of such hierarchical
systems.
We propose the following model for communication of n participants:
1. In the beginning there are n agents.
2. Each turn only g (for our purpose: 2 or 3) agents (groups or individuals) share their
information according to a chosen model. These agents are then merged into one agent
(defined by smodel(s1, . . . , sg)).
In other words, a group of people who shared information, is treated as a single agent in the
next turn. There are two free parameters:
• The model used to combine members’ parameters into group parameters.
• How the groups are formed, i.e., the way to determine which agents should interact in
given turn.
Let us consider the following ways in which groups can form (see Fig. 2 for the diagram
of the two first schemes):
• 4.1 Shallow hierarchy: Each turn g agents from the groups with the least number of
participants interact.
• 4.2 Deep hierarchy: Each turn g − 1 agents join to the group with largest number of
participants (that is, there is only one group to which each turn g − 1 agents join).
• 4.3 Random hierarchy: Each turn g random agents interact.
Above, by participants we understand the total number of individuals that were merged into
an agent.
For some models, the way in which groups are formed is irrelevant for obvious reasons.
This is the case for Random Responder, Best Decides, Direct Signal Sharing and Truth
Wins. The result is always the same and is equivalent to the simplest situation without
any hierarchy. The models, which are affected to some degree, are as follows: Weighted
Confidence Sharing and Voting.
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Shallow Scheme Deep Scheme
Figure 2: Diagram of the interaction ordering for aggregation schemes for g = 2: Shallow Scheme — each
turn two agents from the least numerous groups interact, Deep Scheme — each turn a single participant
joins the previously formed group.
Note that, in principle, agents do not know their own slopes, so the order of interactions
cannot depend upon the individual (or group) si. However, as both sWCS and sV ot depend
linearly on si, averaging over every permutation of participants yields a result that is pro-
portional to the arithmetical mean of si, or 〈s〉. Consequently, to investigate the influence of
the hierarchical information-aggregation, it is sufficient to treat each participant as if his/her
performance is equal to 〈s〉.
For convenience, we consider a more general model with the parameter (the amplification
multiplier) depending on g (the group size) as follows:
sag(s1, . . . , sg) = ag
s1 + . . .+ sg
g
. (36)
This generalization describes both WCS (a2 =
√
2, a3 =
√
3, . . .) and Voting (a3 = 3/2,
. . .), and it allows us to give results in an elegant general form.
4.1. Shallow hierarchy
Our justification for the Shallow hierarchy is the following: people may locally find their
partners and then make a collective decision. Then, iteratively, groups of the same (or
similar) size make the collective decision.
The analysis is simple when the number of participants is a power of g, i.e., n = gk,
where k is a natural number.Then, every several elementary steps the number of agents is
reduced by the factor of g, and agents’ slopes are multiplied by the factor ag. In the end,
we get
sag ,Shallow,g = (ag)
k 〈s〉 = nlogg(ag)〈s〉. (37)
In particular, for Weighted Confidence Sharing (i.e. ag =
√
g), we reach the saturation
sWCS,Shallow,g =
√
n〈s〉. (38)
Thus, the aggregation process does not introduce a decrease in the group performance when
it is compared to collecting all information at once. The formula (38) holds only for n that
is a power of k. However, for different ns the formula works as a very good approximation.
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See Fig. 3 for the numerical results. The relation (i.e., that for groups of size n = gk we
reach the efficiency of model without aggregation or sag ,Shallow,g = sag ,Shallow) is true for
every model described by (36) with ag = gα for any α.
In the Voting model we need to consider the aggregation in a group of at least three (i.e.,
g = 3 and ag = 3/2). Otherwise, it is equivalent to the Random Responder model. For n
being the power of three we get,
sV ot,Shallow,g=3 = n
log3 3/2〈s〉 ≈ n0.37〈s〉, (39)
which works as a good approximation also for the general odd n. For every even n, there
is at least one process with two parties, which significantly decreases the total performance
(as voting for two participants reduces to a coin flip).
4.2. Adding one or two at a time
In this case, there is a single group to which single agents join one after another. The
resulting slope is as for the Weighted Confidence Sharing model:
sWCS,Deep,g=2 = 2
−(n−1)/2〈s〉+
n−1∑
i=1
2−i/2〈s〉 =
(
1 +
√
2− 21−n/2
)
〈s〉 (40)
and for the Voting model for an odd n and aggregation of three
sV ot,Deep,g=3 = 2
(n−1)/2〈s〉+ 2
(n−1)/2∑
i=1
2−i〈s〉 = (2− 2−(n−1)/2) 〈s〉 (41)
We see that the Deep hierarchy is very inefficient. The multiplier of 〈s〉 converges to a
constant. This leads to the conclusion that simultaneous aggregation (i.e., Shallow hierarchy)
is not only more natural but also much more efficient.
To obtain the asymptotic value of sag ,Deep,g, we can consider an equilibrium situation
wherein g − 1 individuals join the group, which has already reached the limit
sag ,Deep,g = ag
(
g − 1
g
〈s〉+ 1
g
sag ,Deep,g
)
. (42)
This leads to:
sag ,Deep,g =
g − 1
g/ag − 1〈s〉. (43)
4.3. Random hierarchy
What happens between the Shallow hierarchy and the Deep hierarchy? If the groups
merge at random, is the final s closer to the most efficient aggregation scheme, or to non-
scaling (e.g., adding a few members at a time)? The answer, not surprisingly, lies in between
these two extremes.
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We parameterize time with t starting from 0. Each turn g agents merge into one of the
slope (36). The current number of agents is described by nt = n0− (g− 1)t. We investigate
how the distribution of slopes ρt(s) evolves with time, which reads
ρt+1(s)− ρt(s) = (44)
− gρt(s)
nt
+
∫
ρt(s1)
nt
· · · ρt(sg)
nt
δ (smodel(s1, · · · , sg)− s) ds1 · · · dsg,
where δ is the Dirac delta, i.e., a distribution such that
∫∞
−∞ f(x)δ(x − x0)dx = f(x0).
The difference in distributions ρt+1(s) − ρt(s) involves two processes. The first expression
means that we take g random agents. These agents interact and are removed from the
distribution. The second expression means that, for every possible group of g agents (with
slopes s1, . . . , sn), a new agent is created with the slope smodel(s1, . . . , sg).
Note that we use integrals, but sum over a finite set will give the same result. The
parameter we are most concerned with is the mean slope, that is
〈s〉t = n−1t
∫
sρt(s)ds. (45)
We multiply (44) by s and integrate
∫ ·ds. In our case, (36), this gives a relatively simple
result: nt+1〈s〉t+1 = nt〈s〉t − g〈s〉t + ag〈s〉t or
〈s〉t = n0 − (g − 1)t+ ag − 1
n0 − (g − 1)t 〈s〉t−1. (46)
To obtain the final result, we need to calculate 〈s〉tmax at the point of time when only one
agent remains. We consider tmax = (n0 − 1)/(g − 1) to be an integer (e.g., for g = 3 we
need to consider an odd number of participants, for g = 2 there are no restrictions). Then,
remembering that 〈s〉0 = 〈s〉 and n0 = n, we get
sag ,Random,g =
tmax∏
t=1
(
n0 − (g − 1)t+ ag − 1
n0 − (g − 1)t
)
〈s〉 (47)
=
Γ
(
1
g−1
)
Γ
(
ag
g−1
) Γ
(
n0
g−1 +
ag−1
g−1
)
Γ
(
n0
g−1
) 〈s〉 (48)
≈
Γ
(
1
g−1
)
Γ
(
ag
g−1
)
(g − 1)(ag−1)/(g−1)
× n(ag−1)/(g−1) × 〈s〉 (49)
where Γ(x) is the Euler gamma function, and we applied the Stirling approximation. For
g = 2, we obtain the neat result
sag ,Random,g=2 ≈
1
Γ(a2)
na2−1〈s〉, (50)
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in particular, for the Weighted Confidence Sharing model (a2 =
√
2) we get
sWCS,Random,g=2 ≈ 1.13n0.41〈s〉, (51)
whereas for the Voting model for g = 3 (and odd number of participants) we get
sV ot,Random,g=3 ≈ 1.22n0.25〈s〉. (52)
In Fig. 3 , we present plots for Weighted Confidence Sharing in aggregation groups of two,
and Voting in groups of three. We use both analytical approximations and numerical results.
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Figure 3: Plot of numerically obtained multipliers of 〈s〉 for models with aggregation of information.
Weighted Confidence Sharing with g = 2 for aggregation hierarchies: Shallow (circles), Deep (diamonds) and
Random (squares). Voting with g = 3, and only for odd number of participants, for aggregation hierarchies:
Shallow (circles), Deep (diamonds) and Random (squares). The lines are the respective analytical results
from Sec. 4. The numerical results for the Random hierarchy are taken from one shot, i.e., they are not
averaged.
5. Discussion on results and comparison of models
For each investigated model, we arrived at the formula for the slope of the group as a
function of individual slopes,
smodel(s1, . . . , sn) = multipliermodel(n)×meanmodel(s1, . . . , sn). (53)
Explicit results can be found in Tab. 1 and Fig. 4. Note that the formula is a product of
two quantities — performance as a function of the group size (i.e., the multiplier), and the
mean of the individual slopes (if the better-performing contribute more to the outcome).
For equally skilled participants, only the multiplier matters, whereas for a group of people
with high variance in performance, the type of mean is crucial.
We not only solved the problem for a particular list of models, but we also constructed
a general framework for the collaborative solving of a two-choice task, i.e., the group per-
formance can be written as
smodel(s1, . . . , sn) = d× nα ×
(
sp1 + . . .+ s
p
n
n
)1/p
, (54)
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where parameters d, α and p can be fitted for any experimental data, even data not covered
by the models we investigated. Note that for p = 1 we arrive at the arithmetic mean, for
p = 2 we arrive at the quadratic mean, and p → ∞ we arrive at the maximum. For the
models we investigated, (54) is either an exact solution (RR, WCS, BD, DSS, TH) or a good
approximation (Voting, information aggregation schemes). If the result is exact, then d = 1
(to be consistent with the case of n = 1).
For a given list of slopes (s1, . . . , sn), it is possible to write relations with the performances
(slopes) for different models which read as follows:
sRR ≤ sV ot < sWCS ≤ sDSS ≤ sTW . (55)
An average-performing participant is expected to benefit from participating in a joint task,
unless the responder is chosen at random (in which case there is neither a gain nor a loss).
It is somewhat more difficult to compare the Best Decides model to the other models, as it
highly depends on the distribution of the participants’ skills. We can write
sRR < sBD < sDSS ≤ sTW . (56)
However, how does the Best Decides model relate to the Voting and the Weighted Confidence
Sharing models? The answer lies in the comparison of the most skilled participant with the
average performance, i.e., max(s)/〈s〉. If this ratio is greater than ≈ 0.8√n, the Best Decides
model outperforms the Voting. If the ratio is greater that
√
n, Best Decides outperforms
the WCS as well. For example, when there is one expert (with sexp > 1 among snon−exp = 1)
among the total number of n participants, then only when sexp >
√
n + 1 it is better for a
group to use the Best Decides strategy.
Model s(s1, s2) s(s1, s2, s3) Mean Multiplier
RR s1+s2
2
s1+s2+s3
3
arithmetic 1
Vot s1+s2
2
s1+s2+s3
2
arithmetic ≈ 0.8√n
BD max(s1, s2) max(s1, s2, s3) maximum 1
WCS s1+s2√
2
s1+s2+s3√
3
arithmetic
√
n
DSS
√
s21 + s
2
2
√
s21 + s
2
2 + s
2
3 quadratic
√
n
TW s1 + s2 s1 + s2 + s3 arithmetic n
Table 1: Models summary for the six considered models of Sec.3. For each model there is given explicit
formula for two and three members. In each model the smodel has the general form multiplier×mean.
For schemes of aggregation (Tab. 2), we obtained two interesting results. First, most
of the models we investigated are not affected by the gradual aggregation of information.
Second, for models that are affected, the optimal solution is to aggregate information in
the smallest possible groups, i.e., in g = 2 for Weighted Confidence Sharing and g = 3 for
Voting.
It is possible that participants’ strategies vary from trial to trial. In such situations, the
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Figure 4: Plot summarizing multipliers for different models.
Model g Shallow hierarchy Random hierarchy Deep hierarchy
Vot 3 n0.37 1.22n0.25 2.00
Vot 4 n0.16 1.15n0.08 1.36
Vot 5 n0.35 1.38n0.19 2.15
WCS 2 n0.5 1.13n0.41 2.41
WCS 3 n0.5 1.25n0.37 2.73
WCS 4 n0.5 1.37n0.33 3.00
WCS 5 n0.5 1.48n0.31 3.23
Table 2: Summary of information-aggregation results (see Sec. 4) in groups of g agents for affected models,
i.e., Voting and Weighted Confidence Sharing. For each model there are provided asymptotic multipliers for
three different information-aggregation hierarchies. In each model the smodel has the form multiplier times
arithmetic mean. Note that for Voting grouping in g = 4 is very ineffective (as, in fact, it effectively uses
the opinions of three out of four participants). Also note that, asymptotically, the most effective approach
(i.e., the best for very large groups) for the Shallow and Deep aggregation schemes is to gather information
in the smallest possible groups of agents (i.e., in g = 3 for Voting and g = 2 for WCS).
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outcome would be a mixture of strategies (with weights wmodel), that is
Peff (c) =
∑
models
wmodelPmodel(c), (57)
seff =
∑
models
wmodelsmodel. (58)
To distinguish between models, the sole analysis of the group performance might not be
enough, as (psychologically) different models of problem-solving can yield the same per-
formance. One can test modified schemes that put additional constraints on participants’
interactions to investigate communication directly. For example, contact with other mem-
bers could be limited to voice or text chat, or no feedback may be provided. In addition,
participants might be asked to express their confidence explicitly on a Likert scale. How-
ever, further experimental work should be carried out to clarify if and when confidence is
subjectively accessible and can be communicated explicitly, and when it can be read from
participants’ behaviors. Preliminary results (?) seem to suggest that the latter is common.
Also the amount of feedback could range from full information about the stimulus to simple
information about accuracy, to no feedback at all. As a reference, it may serve to examine
Social Decision Scheme Theory (Davis, 1973), wherein the group decision is considered to
be a function of individual choices, regardless of skills, confidences or the difficulty of the
task.
In all the models, interaction is beneficial for the overall performance, except for in the
Random Responder model (where the performance is the same as the averaged performance
of each individual). It is possible that beyond a certain critical size, groups start to perform
worse (Grofman, 1978). The models we consider do not predict such a collapse, as they are
based on information sharing and do not incorporate phenomena related to motivation and
social or technical ability to work in groups.
6. Conclusion
In the paper, we examined mathematical models for solving a two-choice discriminative
task by a group of participants. We were interested in how group performance depended
upon the performance of the individuals, their ways of communication and their modes of
decision aggregation. As a measure of performance, we used the slope of the psychometric
function (3), which indicates how performance changes with the difficulty of the task. The
higher the slope of s is, the better the performance of the individual (or the group).
We analyzed a number of possible models of decision integration in a joint task. As
we moved from 2-person to n-person groups, we also had to take into account patterns of
interaction among members. Obviously, the choice of the way in which aggregate decisions of
group members are made is not always unconstrained. Some of the models, it seems, can be
adopted in almost all group decision situations (such as the Random Responder model and
the Voting model). Regardless of the properties of the stimuli, people can make their own
decisions and vote. For the Best Decides model, we need to assume that the group possess
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information about the members’ performances (e.g., from the feedback). Other models (i.e.,
the Weighted Confidence Sharing, the Direct Signal Sharing and the Truth Wins models)
make direct assumptions about the problem structure or the information that can be shared.
Consequently, they can be considered only in particular tasks, in which a certain level of
confidence in an individual’s own answer can be reached. Our list of models is by no means
exhaustive.
We need to be aware of the fact that the presented models are valid only for our specific
situation (collaborative decisions in a two-choice perceptive task wherein difficulty can be
smoothly adjusted). Other tasks may be analyzed within the same paradigm, such as inte-
grating information in an individual’s mind. Several exposures to the same stimulus by a
single person, perhaps using different senses or with different noise levels, would be another
subject for further investigation. Such an approach is presented in experiments on sensory
integration, e.g., by Ernst and Banks (2002), which serve as one of the motivations for the
Bahrami et al. (2010) models. Perhaps collaborative decisions in other two-choice tasks
(e.g., verbal or mathematical decisions) could also be treated in a similar fashion. However,
for many other settings, more advanced models are needed, e.g., ones that take into account
more choices or the dynamic interaction between solving a problem in an individual’s mind
and communicating that decision to the other participants. Nevertheless, we believe that
the first step should be to experimentally verify the predicted results of this paper (with an
emphasis on the scaling of the performance), before proceeding to more advanced theoretical
models.
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Appendix A. Approximations
P (c) can be expanded in Taylor series of c around c = −b.
P (c) = P [−b+ (c+ b)] (A.1)
= P (−b) + (c+ b)P ′(−b) + (c+b)2
2
P ′′(−b) + (c+b)3
6
P ′′′(−b) + . . . (A.2)
where P (i)(−b) can be found explicitly using (1),
P (i)(c) =
1
σi
H(i)( c+b
σ
). (A.3)
In particular H(0) = 1/2, H ′(0) = 1/
√
2pi, H ′′(0) = 0, H ′′′(0) = −2/√2pi.
Consequently,
P (c) =
1
2
+
(c+ b)√
2piσ
+O
[
( c+b
σ
)3
]
, (A.4)
that is, the approximation error of taking the linear approximation is of the order (c+b)3/σ3
as the quadratic term vanishes. Plugging c = 0 we obtain
P (0) =
1
2
+
b√
2piσ
+O
[
( b
σ
)3
]
(A.5)
=
1
2
+ sb+O[(sb)3] (A.6)
and similarly, the derivative of (A.4) in 0 is
P ′(c)|c=0 = 1√
2piσ
+
1√
2piσ
O
[
( b
σ
)2
]
(A.7)
= s
[
1 +O(s2b2)
]
. (A.8)
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The last equation gives the approximate equation for slope (7). Another expression
P (0)− 1/2
P ′(c)|c=0 =
b+ bO[(sb)2]
1 +O[(sb)2]
= b
[
1 +O(s2b2)
]
(A.9)
yields in the approximate equation for bias (8).
Appendix B. Voting
PV ot(c) =
bn−1
2
c∑
k=1
∑
~i
[1− Pi1(c)] · · · [1− Pik(c)]Pik+1(c) · · ·Pin(c) (B.1)
+
1
2
∑
~i
[1− Pi1(c)] · · ·
[
1− Pin/2(c)
]
Pin/2+1(c) · · ·Pin(c)

if n is even
,
After plugging the linearization (A.4) in the above, and using µi = si(bi + c), each part has
the form of [
1
2
− µi1 +O(µ3i1)
] · · · [1
2
− µik +O(µ3ik)
]
(B.2)
×
[
1
2
+ µik+1 +O(µ
3
ik+1
)
]
· · · [1
2
+ µin +O(µ
3
in)
]
(B.3)
= 1
2n
− 1
2n−1 (µi1 + . . .+ µik) +
1
2n−1
(
µik+1 + . . .+ µin
)
(B.4)
+O(µ21) + . . .+O(µ
2
n) (B.5)
After applying permutations to the main part (i.e., without the error estimation) we get
1
2n
(
n
k
)
+
1
2n−1
(
n
k
)
[−k + (n− k)] µ1 + . . .+ µn
n
(B.6)
=
1
2n
(
n
k
)
+
n
2n−1
[
−
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
+
(
n− 1
k
)]
µ1 + . . .+ µn
n
, (B.7)
which is easy to be summed. The first component sums to 1/2. In the second, binomial
coefficients cancel pairwise, except for
(
n−1
0−1
)
= 0 and
(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c
)
leaving only
(
n−1
k
)
for k =
b(n− 1)/2c. Consequently, when n is odd, one gets
PV ot,odd(c) =
1
2
+
n
2n−1
(
n− 1
(n− 1)/2
)
µ1 + . . .+ µn
n
+O(µ21) + . . .+O(µ
2
n) (B.8)
and for even n
PV ot,even(c) =
1
2
+
n
2n−1
(
n− 1
(n− 2)/2
)
µ1 + . . .+ µn
n
+O(µ21) + . . .+O(µ
2
n). (B.9)
After the differentiation one obtains the slope (7) and the bias (8).
22
